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ABSTRACT 
The rapid expansion of Internet use at the turn of the 21st century brought with it a new 
medium of commerce. As the Internet started to act as a substitute for traditional retail and 
service sectors, an important economic question has been the impact of this change on mar-
ket structure in different industries. This dissertation examines the changing structure of two 
particular industries in this new era of the Internet: the banking industry and Yellow Pages 
advertising. 
Chapter I examines whether bank branches are still important in attracting deposits from 
consumers. Despite their historic role in helping commercial banks to grow, branches may be 
decreasing in importance today due to the widespread use of Internet banking. The paper 
develops a structural dynamic model of consumer demand for bank deposits. The model is 
estimated using yearly bank level data for all commercial banks in Massachusetts from 2001 to 
2009. Results show that branching still affects market shares significantly, however, the impact 
is declining over the sample period. 
Chapter II analyzes consumer welfare in the banking industry. The purpose of the paper is to 
measure the impact of recent changes in bank characteristics on consumer welfare. Specifically, 
v 
the goal is to examine how the increase in the number of branches and the decrease in the average 
distance of these branches to consumers have impacted consumer welfare. Average consumer 
welfare is found to be 4.2% higher in 2009 compared to 2001. Estimation of two counterfactuals 
reveals that both of the changes in bank characteristics have been beneficial to consumers. 
Chapter III focuses on the Yellow Pages advertising market. The goal of the study is to 
estimate how the extensive use of Internet has affected prices and market structure in the Yellow 
Pages advertising market. In contrast to most of the recent empirical literature, this paper 
considers the impact of Internet use on prices in addition to market structure. The main finding 
is that an increase in Internet use in a given directory's coverage area is associated with an 
increase in printed advertising prices and a decrease in the number of publishers. 
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Chapter 1 
Is Branching Still Important to Consumers? A 
Dynamic Model of Consumer Demand for Banking 
Deposits 
1.1 Introduction 
The deregulation in the banking industry in the United States (US), marked by the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, has substantially changed the 
branching behavior of banks. Mter the deregulation, there has been a massive increase in the 
total number of branches and the number of branches per bank. Today, however, branching may 
be decreasing in importance due to the widespread use of Internet banking. The goal of the 
paper is to answer the question whether branches are still attracting deposits from consumers 
today. To answer this question, the paper develops a structural dynamic model of consumer 
demand for bank deposits in which banks provide differentiated products. The model is then 
applied to the commercial banks in Massachusetts to estimate the consumer taste parameters for 
branches. An important policy issue that this research can potentially contribute to is merger 
control legislation for the banking industry. If branches do remain to be significantly related to 
banks' market shares, then in a given merger decision it might be necessary to consider the size 
of the branch network that a potential merger would create. 
The structural dynamic model of demand draws on the techniques of Gowrisankaran & Rys-
man (2011) . There is a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who make a discrete choice from 
a set of banks every period in a multinomial logit framework, where banks provide differenti-
2 
ated products. The consumers have the option to switch banks at any period and they incur a 
fixed switching cost if they decide to do so. Consumers are rational forward-looking agents who 
believe that the value of purchase will follow a simple Markov process. Accordingly, they use 
a reduced-form approximation of the supply side to make predictions about the value of future 
purchases. 
Consumer utility at a given period depends on the characteristics of the bank where she has 
an account. Bank characteristics evolve over time and include the number of branches, average 
distance of these branches to consumers, size and age of the bank, number of employees, deposits 
per branch and the interest rate on deposits. The aim of the model is to estimate consumer taste 
parameters for these bank characteristics and the switching costs. 
The model controls for the possible endogeneity of the interest rates by constructing and 
using a set of instruments in the estimation procedure. Observable bank characteristics are 
allowed to have random coefficients to generate heterogeneity in consumer tastes. The model 
uses a random coefficients framework because Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995) and the literature 
that followed (Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002) and others) has shown that incorporating consumer 
heterogeneity into differentiated product markets is crucial in order to get realistic predictions. 
A dynamic model is necessary due to costs involved in switching a bank. Specifically, the 
consumers incur a cost whenever they decide to switch their banks due to the inconvenience 
caused by transferring funds , reordering checks, applying for new credit cards, learning the 
branch locations, etc. According to the 1999 Michigan Survey of Consumers people rarely 
switch banks (every 10 years on average). When they are asked about the reason they stayed 
with their current bank, 34% reply it is because it 's "too much trouble to switch" (Kiser (2002)). 
Any static model that ignores the switching costs will result in unrealistic coefficient estimates 
for the consumer parameters of interest. 
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The model is applied to the commercial banks in Massachusetts (MA) using yearly aggregate 
level data from 2001 to 2009. Bank level data comes from three main sources: the Summary of 
Deposits (SOD), the Institution Directory (ID) for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports). The population 
data and the distribution of consumers come from 2000 US Census. Market share of a bank 
is computed using the ratio of deposits in all branches in MA to total deposits in MA. The 
final dataset is an unbalanced panel of 1600 observations at the bank-year level with 209 unique 
banks. 
The paper finds that branching still matters. Even after controlling for bank characteristics 
such as bank size and deposit interest rates, market share of a bank responds positively to 
having more branches and the effect is significant. However, in line with the motivation of the 
paper, the effect of branches on market shares seems to be decreasing over time. Having more 
branches increases market shares less in most years following 2001 relative to the effect in 2001. 
Consumers also care about the proximity of the branches. Banks with branches that are closer 
to consumers on average have higher market shares, and these effects are statistically significant. 
The fixed cost incurred to switch banks is found to be crucial in the consumer's decision 
problem. The estimated switching cost is equivalent to having about a 4% increase in deposit 
interest rates. Intuitively, the finding implies that people will not switch banks for a higher 
interest rate in another bank unless the difference is more than 4%. Moreover, comparing the 
static model results without the switching cost with the dynamic ones reveals that ignoring 
the switching cost leads the static model to underestimate the price sensitivity of consumers to 
deposit interest rates. Accordingly, one can conclude that it is crucial to consider the switching 
cost in a dynamic setting in order to get more reasonable and reliable coefficient estimates. 
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, in contrast to most of the empirical 
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literature on demand estimation for banking deposits, which employ static demand models, 
this paper uses a dynamic model of consumer demand. The dynamic approach allows for the 
estimation of more realistic consumer taste parameters and the switching costs. Examples using 
static models include: Ho & Ishii (2010), Ishii (2005), Adam et al. (2007), Dick (2008), Knittel 
and Stango (2008), Zhou (2008) and Wang (2009) for the US, Nakane et al. (2006) for Brazil, Ho 
(2007) for Hong Kong, Molnar et al. (2007) for Hungary and Molnar (2008) for Finland. Second, 
it extends the literature on estimation of dynamic demand by differing from the methodology 
of Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2011) in three aspects. First, a given consumer's utility of the 
same product is allowed to be time varying. Specifically, even if the consumer decides not to 
switch banks, the utility she gets from her own bank changes every period with the changing 
bank characteristics. Second, it allows for the estimation of the switching cost. And third, 
product characteristics are allowed to be time-varying. Previous work has handled one or more 
of these extensions separately. Shcherbakov (2008), Ho (2009) and Schiraldi (2011) estimate the 
switching costs in a dynamic setting. Schiraldi (2011) allows consumer's own utility to evolve, 
and Shcherbakov (2008) lets the product characteristics vary over time. In contrast, this paper 
implements all three extensions together in the same setting. 
There has been several papers using the estimation methodology of Gowrisankaran & Rysman 
(2011). Examples include Ho (2009), Schiraldi (2011), Shcherbakov (2008), Lee (2011) and 
Zhao (2008) . Ho (2009) estimates a dynamic model of demand for deposits in China; Schiraldi 
(2011) studies scrapping subsidies for automobiles; Shcherbakov (2008) estimates the switching 
costs between cable and satellite television in a dynamic setting; Lee (2011) examines product 
incompatibility in the US videogame industry, and Zhao (2008) considers markups for digital 
cameras. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides background in-
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formation on the industry and motivation; Section 1.3 describes the data; Section 1.4 presents 
the model and the estimation algorithm; Section 1.5 reports and discusses the empirical findings 
and Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Industry Background & Motivation 
There are three major types of banks in the US: commercial banks, savings and loan associations, 
and credit unions. Commercial banks dominate the industry and they offer a wide variety of 
services such as providing checking and savings accounts, loans to customers, and investment 
services such as mutual funds. Savings and loan associations, also called thrift institutions, 
are the second largest group of depository institutions. Originally they were established as 
community-based institutions to finance mortgages for people to buy homes.l What sets credit 
unions apart from the other two categories of banks is that they are formed by people who are 
related by a common bond, such as those who work for the same company. In these institutions, 
loans and savings accounts are restricted to members. The focus of this paper is going to be on 
the commercial banks. 
The US banking industry had been characterized by geographical restrictions until 1994. 
Branching was almost entirely prohibited by the McFadden Act of 1927 that made it illegal 
for commercial banks to operate across state lines. Additional state laws substantially limited 
banks' ability to open branches even across county lines. As of 1985, 22 states had substantial 
restrictions on in-state branching (Amel (1993)). In 1980, a typical bank was quite small; it had 
on average a mere 2.68 branches (DeYoung et. al. (2004)), as opposed to having 12 branches on 
average in 2009. 
Deregulation was marked by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
1 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Figure 1-1: Number of Banks and Branches in the US 
-,-----------------------::--= 14,000 
13,000 
12,000 ~ 
= 
11 ,000 ] 
'-0 
10,000 'It 
9,000 
-t----,--.,-----,-- ,----,-- ,--,-,--,-,-----,-- ,----,-,---'f- 8,000 
.... 
"' 
00 0 
0> 0> 
"' 
0 
~ ~ ~ 0 N 
-+-# ofbranches -+-# ofbanks 
N 
0 
0 
N 
.... 
0 
0 
N 
"' 0 0 
N 
00 
0 
0 
N 
Source: FDIC Summary of Deposits (SOD) 
of 1994 which allowed banks to acquire other banks or set up branches in other states, repealing 
the previous restrictions of the McFadden Act. After the deregulation, the US banking industry 
underwent a rapid transition. Number of banks started to decline as banks entered into new 
markets by acquiring or merging with banks in other states. At the same time, the number of 
branches increased substantially as banks exercised their freedom to open new branches. Figure 
1.1 shows the general trends in the banking industry in the US since the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. 
Number of branches increased substantially from 81,297 in 1994 to almost 100,000 in 2009. Total 
number of banks experienced a steady decline from 13,002 in 1994 to 8,185 in 2009. 
Despite the steady increase in the number of branches across the US since 1994, branching 
may be decreasing in importance today due to the widespread use of Internet banking. It has 
been suggested by many that Internet banking might make the traditional branches obsolete. 
However, today banks still heavily rely on branching to keep their existing customers and attract 
new ones. The main reason is that branches still seem to be in demand by the consumers. 
According to American Bankers Association (ABA) annual consumer surveys, traditional 
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Figure 1·2: Preferred Banking Methods (for all age groups) 
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branches have been the most preferred method of banking for consumers consistently until2009. 2 
In 2009, for the first time ever, the survey showed that more bank customers (25%) prefer to 
do their banking online compared to branches (21%), and this trend continued in 2010 (Figure 
1.2). It should be noted that the survey is conducted by telephone and shows the willingness 
of consumers to take a telephone survey. If, for example, people who are willing to take the 
telephone survey are more likely to use online banking then the results might be deceiving. 
Although branches no longer seem to be the most preferred method of banking, they are a 
long way from being obsolete. This is mostly due to the fact that a traditional branch has its 
advantages over other forms when it comes to services that require interaction. For instance, the 
CEO of Bank of America has stated that "customers especially want face-to-face contact when 
opening accounts and getting loans," when he was explaining the bank's ambitious branching 
strategy (Dick (2007)). 
2 American Bankers Association does an annual survey of 1,000 US consumers by telephone. Survey conducted 
by Ipsos-Reid. 
8 
Distance of branches to consumers also still seems to matter. Evidence from surveys continues 
to show that proximity to a branch is important to consumers. Using 1999 Michigan Survey of 
Consumers, Kiser (2002) finds that "location convenience" is one of the most frequent consumer 
responses when people are asked the reason of choosing their current bank (Figure 1.3). 
Another interesting fact that motivated looking at the distance measure in this paper is 
the recent contradictory behavior of two of the banks with the largest branch networks in the 
US. Specifically, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase Bank recently announced contradictory 
policies regarding the expansion of their branch networks. 3 
Figure 1 -3: Reasons for Staying with the Current Bank 
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Chase Bank announced to add at least 1,000 branches to its network in the next three years, 
whereas Bank of America stated it will reduce its branches in 2011. The fact that these two banks 
have almost the same number of branches nationwide (Table 1.1) but different policies regarding 
branch expansion suggests that the driving force behind Chase Bank 's expansion policy might 
3
"JPMorgan Multiplies as Bank of America Shrinks in Deposit Grab, " Dakin Campbell, 
Bloomberg News, June 14, 2011. 
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Table 1.1: Top 5 Commercial Banks in the US by Number of Branches 
Institution Name 
1 Wells Fargo Bank, National Association 
2 Bank of America, National Association 
3 JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association 
4 U.S. Bank National Association 
5 PNC Bank, National Association 
*As of June 30 2011 , FDIC SOD 
No. of Branches* 
6,382 
5,852 
5,431 
3,138 
2,618 
Figure 1·4: Branch Distributions of Bank of America and Chase 
Branches ofBank of America (2010) 
Branches of Chase Bank (2010) 
10 
be to be closer to consumers on average. As Figure 1.44 shows, Chase Bank's network is less 
dispersed the one of Bank of America, and this might be the reason why Chase Bank wants to 
increase its number of branches. The motivation behind considering the impact of the distance 
measure in this paper is to see how much dispersion and average distance to consumers indeed 
matters. 
1.3 Data 
The data set used is an unbalanced panel for all commercial banks in Massachusetts from 2001 
to 2009. It has 1600 observations at the bank-year level for 209 unique banks. The final dataset 
is created by combining bank level data with census data on population. Geocoding is used to 
get the exact location (latitude, longitude) of all branches and to calculate the average distance 
of each bank to all consumers.5 
Bank level data comes from three sources: the Summary of Deposits (SOD), the Institution 
Directory (ID) for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Consolidated Re-
ports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) . The information on the distribution of consumers 
is taken from the 2000 US Census. 
There are 1367 census tracts in MA. Census tracts are small, relatively permanent statistical 
subdivisions of a county. They usually have between 2,500 and 8,000 persons and do not cross 
county boundaries.6 The 2000 US Census data provides the population of each tract, and the 
exact location of the center of the tract. 
SOD provides yearly branch level data for all branches of commercial banks in the US, 
including the exact location and value of deposits of each branch. This data set is used to 
calculate the number of branches of each bank, market shares and the average distance of each 
4 Source: Bank of America footprint.png, JPMorgan Chase footprint.png (Wikimedia Commons Projects). 
5 Distance calcula tion is described below in detail. 
6Source: US Census Bureau 
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bank to consumers (distjt)- First, each branch address is geocoded to get the exact latitude and 
longitude of the branch's location. 7 Next, distance from the center of each census tract r to the 
closest branch of bank j in time t ( mindistrjt) is computed. Figure 1.5 illustrates the calculation 
of the distance between census tracts and the closest branch of a bank with a simple example. 
For simplicity, the figure assumes there are eight census tracts and eight branches of Bank of 
America in Massachusetts. Then, it shows the computation of the distance at the tract level 
between the center of each tract and the closest branch of Bank of America. 
\ 
• 
Figure 1 ·5: Distance Calculation 
Massachusetts 
\ 
• 
I 
branches of Bank of America center of tract r mindist_rjt 
Once the distance is computed at the tract level, a composite distance measure is calcu-
lated for each bank. Specifically, the weighted average distance of bank j at time t to all 
tracts/consumers is given by 
distjt = L(mindistrjt)P(r) , 
Vr 
where the weight of each tract is going to be population of tract divided by total population of 
all tracts i.e. P(r) = population of tract r. 
' populatwn of MA 
7 Geocoding service provided by USC WebGIS Services. Available online at: https: / jwebgis. usc.edu. 
Variable 
year es1ablished 
age 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Units 
1893.105 44.27317922008 years 
111.666 44.356 0.000 217 years 
Item source 
(ID) 
(ID) 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
branches 7079 17.0511.000 269 (SOD) 
employees 2.727 16.8600.020 282 100 (Call Reports) 
service charges 765.589 3833 .403 0.000 76,792 1,000 ($) (Call Reports) 
deposits 582,526 1,983,160 14.000 26,300,000 1,000 ($) (SOD) 
deposits per branch 1.925 13 .342 14.000 24,100,000 I 00,000,000 ($) (SOD) 
net income 0.051 0.853 -27.115 10.534 I 00,000,000 ($) (ID) 
assets 10.503 57.30 1 0.101 1,044.972 100,000,000 ($) (Call Reports) 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
interest expenditures I 0,981 
domestic interest expenditure 8,461 
domestic deposits 311 ,312 
64,9850.000 
31 ,0500.000 
3,140, 101 0.000 
I ,362,014 I ,000 ($) 
548,703 I ,000 ($) 
25,900,000 I ,000 ($) 
(Call Reports) 
(Call Reports) 
(Call Reports) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
interest rate (semi-annual) 1.346 
apr 2.712 
0.466 
0.944 
0.000 2.363 
0.000 4.782 
% 
% 
dom int exp/dan deposits 
(I +interest rate Y'2-l 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
distance 38.235 17 .0 16 2.395 I 00.820 miles 
In( distance) 3.562 0.404 0.874 4.613 
# observations: 1600 
ID provides detailed yearly bank level data. Specifically, bank characteristics such as the 
number of employees and established year are available in the ID. Call Reports, on the other 
hand, are filed by banks quarterly and include detailed information about the balance sheet and 
the performance of the bank. Call reports are used to get bank characteristics such as total 
deposits, total assets and the deposit interest rate. Since FDIC collects SOD data as of June 30 
of each year, the second quarter data in the Call Reports is used to make it compatible with the 
SOD data. Second quarter data is year-to-date for the first six months of each year. 
The bank-level deposit interest rate is computed as the ratio of interest expense on domestic 
deposits to total domestic deposits. This interest rate is semi-annual since the second quarter 
Call Reports data is year-to-date for the first six months of each year. The annual percentage 
rate (apr) is computed by compounding the semi-annual rate (apr = (1 +interest rate)2 - 1). 
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The apr is used as the deposit interest rate in all estimations in this paper. 
Age of the bank is used as a right hand side variable to control for the years of experience of a 
bank since older banks might have higher market shares purely due to being around longer. Total 
assets of the bank are used to control for the size of the bank since bigger banks are expected 
to have higher market shares. In addition, the regressions control for the deposit interest rate, 
deposits per branch and the number of full time equivalent employees. Summary statistics of 
these variables are shown in Table 1.2. There is a wide variety of banks in Massachusetts from 
the ones established as early as the 1700s to 2008. On average, a bank has around 7 branches 
in Massachusetts. The average annual interest rate is 2. 7 %. 
The general trends in the banking industry in Massachusetts during my sample period closely 
resemble the overall US trends in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.6 shows that the number of branches in 
Massachusetts increased from 1972 in 2001 to about 2250 in 2009. Total number of banks 
decreased from 238 in 2001 to 197 in 2009.8 
Figure 1·6: Number of Branches and Banks in Massachusetts 
2,300 
2,250 
1"1.> 2,200 
~ 
.cl 2,150 
~ 2,100 
e 2,o5o e 2,000 
0 1,950 
=It 1,900 
1,850 
1,800 
+----+---__,._ __ 
---..... -----.....---+--+-.._ ...--------
______.---
~ 
----~ 
----
IV'"' 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1-a-# of branches -+- #of banks I 
250 
200 
~ 
150 = ~ 
.c 
100 'Q 
=It 
50 
0 
8 Most of the change in the number of banks is due to exit. There is a total of 5 banks entering the market 
during the entire sample period. 
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Even though the total number of banks decrease and the number of branches increase during 
the sample period, these changes might be merely due to changes in population. To make sure 
these trends reflect real changes, Figure 1.7 shows the number of branches and banks per capita 
during the sample period. Specifically, changes in the number of branches per 10,000 people and 
the number of banks per 1,000 people are illustrated. The figure demonstrates that even after 
controlling for the increase in population, the trends remain the same. The number of banks per 
capita steadily decline from 2002 to 2009; the number branches per capita rise over the sample 
period except for a little dip in 2006. 
Figure 1·7: Number of Branches and Banks in Massachusetts per Capita 
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It is established that the number of branches are on the rise even after controlling for the 
changes in population. However, one further question of interest is what's happening to branch 
sizes throughout the same period. If the branches are getting smaller as their overall number is 
increasing, this might mean that the demand is actually constant throughout the sample period. 
To check for this possibility, Figure 1.8 shows the evolution of the average size of a branch in 
Massachusetts. The average size seems to increase from 2000 to 2003 after which it becomes 
fairly constant. One can conclude that branches are definitely not becoming smaller in size 
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during the sample period; if anything they are getting bigger on average.9 
Figure 1 -8: Size of Branches in Massachusetts 
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1.4 Model and Estimation 
This section introduces the dynamic model of consumer demand in detail and explains the 
estimation algorithm. 
1.4.1 Model 
The model assumes that there is a continuum of heterogeneous potential consumers indexed by 
~- Consumers have infinite horizons and they discount the future with a common factor /3 . 
Banks are indexed by j = 0, 1, ... , Jt, where Jt denotes the number of banks present in year t, 
and j = 0 refers to the outside option of not having an account anywhere. At a given time t, 
every consumer has an endowed bank account at bank j = 0, 1, ... , Jt, meaning she either h as an 
account in one of Jt banks or doesn't have an account at alL 
At every year t, the consumer is faced with the same decision problem. Specifically, consumer 
9 Figure 1.12 in Appendix l.A shows the evolution in the size of branches in the entire US using employees per 
branch as the measure of size. 
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i has to decide between waiting and keeping her endowed bank account or switching to one of the 
Jt banks out there. One assumption of the model is that once you have an account at a bank, 
you cannot go back to having no account, j = 0. The assumption is quite reasonable since once 
you have an account at any bank, you get used to the convenience of having an account and do 
not want to go back to keeping your money in the sock drawer. Whether the consumer chooses 
to stick with her endowment at time t or choose one of the Jt banks, she is faced with a similar 
decision problem at time t + 1. She makes a discrete choice from a set of banks to maximize the 
sum of discounted value of future expected utilities conditional on the information she has at 
timet. 
Consumer Utility 
Every period, the consumer receives a certain level of utility depending on the characteristics of 
the bank where she has an account. If she decides to switch banks at time t, she incurs the fixed 
switching cost T. Formally, the utility consumer i receives from bank j at timet is denoted by 
{ 
fijt - T + C:ijt 
Uijt = 
fijt + C:ijt 
if you switch to j , j = l.. .Jt, 
if you keep your endowment, j = 0, l...Jt , 
where C:ijt is an idiosyncratic type 1 extreme value unobservable that is independent across 
consumers, banks and time; T is the switching cost to be estimated; and fijt is the flow utility 
consumer i gets from bank j at time t which depends on the bank characteristics. Specifically, 
f ijt = { 
afXjt + ~jt for j = l.. .Jt , 
0 for j = 0, 
The vector Xjt contains the observed characteristics of bank j at time t, and ~jt denotes an 
unobserved product characteristic. 10 Observed characteristics include the deposit interest rate, 
10 Xjt includes a constant as its first a rguement. 
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number of branches, average distance of branches to consumers, number of full-time employees, 
deposits per branch, age and assets of the bank. For individuals who do not have an account 
anywhere, the flow utility is normalized to zero. In the flow utility specification, a:f denotes 
a consumer specific vector of random coefficients that represents consumer preferences over 
characteristics Xjt · In this sense, the functional form of the flow utility is similar to the random 
coefficients discrete choice framework of Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995). 
If an individual decides to keep her endowment, then her endowment utility fijt evolves 
according to a simple linear autoregressive process. Allowing fijt to change over time is one of 
the major differences between this model and Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2011). They assume 
endowment utility stays the same as long as you keep the same product. The evolution of fijt is 
given by the equation 
(1.1) 
where Ei t is a normal random variable with mean 0. 
It is important to note that not all elements of Xjt are allowed to have random coefficients. 
Only the constant term and the interest rate have random coefficients to allow for heterogeneity 
in general consumer tastes and in tastes for prices, respectively. Let O:i = ( af, ai) be the 2x1 
vector of random coefficients on the constant term and the interest rate. The vector O:i is assumed 
to be constant over time and distributed normally following N(a , I::) , where a =(ac, ar) is the 
vector of means, and I:: is the covariance matrix. Specifically, 
where O"~ and O"~ are the variances of af and ai respectively. Estimation algorithm uses a diagonal 
I:: matrix, although it is easy to add correlation terms. 
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Finally, the mean flow utility (to all consumers) from bank j in timet is defined as 
j = l...Jt_ 
Letting k be the number of characteristics in Xjt, a x denotes the kxl vector of mean coeffi-
cients across all consumers. The main goal of the model is to estimate (ax , 'E), mean consumer 
tastes and variances, respectively. 
Dynamic Problem 
Before specifying the dynamic decision process, consumer expectations about the utility from 
future products should be formalized. In this model, it is assumed that consumers only know 
the distributions of idiosyncratic shocks c:, not their future values. Set of banks and bank 
characteristics change over time. Consumers are uncertain about future bank characteristics but 
they have rational expectations about their evolution. More specifically, it is assumed that each 
consumer is correct about the mean and variance of the future quality path on average over time. 
To summarize, the consumer's choice depends on her preferences (ai), the idiosyncratic 
shock (cit), endowment utility (fijt) and all the information she possesses at time t about the 
bank characteristics. Accordingly, the state variables for the dynamic problem are (cit, fijt, Dt), 
where €it = (c:iot,·····ciJtt) denotes the vector of idiosyncratic shocks for all banks present in time 
t, fijt denotes the endowment utility of consumer i in time t , and Dt is the current information 
set available to consumers including the number of banks, all current bank characteristics and 
any other factors that influence future bank attributes. It is assumed that Dt+l evolves according 
to a Markov process P(nt+11Dt) that accounts for firm optimizing behavior. 
Let Vi(cit}ijt, Dt) be the value function for consumer i. Then, the Bellman equation can be 
written as follows. 
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max { f;;. + E<j< + ~E [V; ( £"+1, h;<+l' n,+l[ll,' /;;<)], ( 1. 2) 
value of waiting, keeping endowment 
max {!ikt- T + Eikt + (3E [Vi((e:it+l,!ikt+l, Dt+liDt, fiktn} . k=l..Jt 
value of switching to best k 
It should be noted that in the dynamic model, the discount factor (3 is not a parameter to be 
estimated; it is simply set (3 = 0.99.ll Here, the implicit assumption is that when you open an 
account for the first time, you are also incurring the switching cost T. Intuitively, since you are 
switching from the state of not having an account to having one, you incur the 'start-up' cost of 
looking around. 
Let EV'i(Jijt , Dt) = ! Eit Vi(e:it , fijt, Dt)dPE be the expectation ofthe value function integrated 
over C"it,then the Bellman equation is simplified as follows. 
max{ fijt + Eijt + (3E [EV'i(Jijt+l, Dt+liDt, !ijt)] , (1.3) 
k~\axJt { !ikt - T + Eikt + (3 E [ EVi Uikt+ 1' nt+ II Dt' fikt) l} } . 
The aggregation properties of type 1 extreme value distribution can be used to further sim-
plify the Bellman equation. Rust (1987) and Anderson, De Palma & Thisse (1992) show that the 
value of the best choice from several options in a logit model can be expressed as the logarithm 
sum of the exponents of the mean utility of each option plus a single type 1 extreme value error. 
Applying the simplification proposed by Rust (1987) to this context, the choice problem above 
11 I do not attempt to estimate f3 because it is notoriously difficult to identify the discount factor for dynamic 
decision models (see Magnac & Thesmar, 2002). 
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becomes12 
EVi(fijt , nt) = ln (efi;t+.BE[EViUiit+I ,nt+IInt ,fi;t)] + L efikt-T+,BE[EVi(fikt+I,nt+IInt.fikt)]) 
k=l..Jt 
(1.4) 
Let c5it be the inclusive value of switching to any bank, 
(1.5) 
then equation ( 4) can be simplified to 
(1.6) 
Intuitively, the Rust simplification allows us to transform the original choice problem rep-
resented by equation (3) into equation (6) where at each period, the consumer either makes a 
one-time switch to a bank with mean utility c5it or waits and holds her endowed account with 
flow utility /ijt· 
Having Dt as a state variable makes the state space too big for computational purposes. 
Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2011) uses a specific methodology in order to reduce the infinite 
dimensional state space Dt.l3 Following their methodology, this paper assumes that all states 
with the same inclusive value c5it have the same expected value so that it is sufficient to condition 
the value function on c5it instead of Dt. Accordingly, the state space is reduced to (fijtAt) with 
two dimensions instead of the many dimensional (fijt,Dt)· The final form of the expectation 
Bellman equation is 
12The Euler 's constant is omitted from this equation since it is a constant and doesn't affect the decision . 
1 3 Specific methodology and its robustness is discussed in Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2011). 
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(1.7) 
In order to formalize the evolution of c5it , it is assumed that it follows a simple linear autore-
gressive (AR(1)) specification, 
(1.8) 
where Wit is distributed normally with mean 0. This functional form is commonly used in the 
existing dynamic literature. 14 
Market Shares 
Probability that consumer i switches to bank j in time t , denoted by Sijt, can be calculated as 
the probability of switching times the probability of switching to bank j conditional on switching. 
For notational simplicity, let Oijt denote the mean expected discounted utility from switching to 
bank j at time t. Specifically, 
(1.9) 
Then, Sijt can be computed as 
Prob(switch) * Prob(jlswitch) (1.10) 
14 Melnikov (2001) , Hendel & Nevo (2006), Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2009) . 
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Predicted market shares Sjt is then computed as the average of individual probabilities for 
ns draws of consumers, 
sJ·t = 2.- ~ siJ't. 
ns ~ 
i=l ... ns 
(1.11) 
It is important to note that the model is designed to estimate the demand side parameters 
only, without explicitly solving for the firm 's optimizing behavior. For the supply side, it is 
assumed that entry and exit decisions of banks are exogenous, and that bank characteristics also 
evolve exogenously. 
1.4.2 Estimation 
As mentioned before, the main goal of the model is to estimate the parameters ax and :E , i.e. 
mean consumer tastes for bank characteristics and variance in consumer tastes. The method-
ology used to estimate these parameters is based on the one developed by Gowrisankaran & 
Rysman (2011). Namely, the estimation procedure involves three levels of non-linear optimiza-
tions. The inside loop computes the predicted market shares by solving the consumer's dynamic 
optimization problem; the middle loop performs a BLP type fixed point algorithm using the 
predicted market shares; and the outside loop involves a non-linear search over the parameters 
to minimize the objective function. This section explains in detail how each loop works. 
Mter simulating a number of consumers, ns, the inside loop solves the dynamic optimization 
problem for each consumer and integrates across consumers to calculate the predicted market 
shares Sjt as a function of (fjt, :E).l5 fjt denotes the vector of mean flow utilities for all banks j 
in all periods t. 
15 ln practice l use ns = 20 in the estimations. I have tried ns = 5, 10, 20 , 50 and using different number of 
individuals doesn 't change the results significantly. 
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,...... rvC rvr 
Specifically, let ai = (ai , ai ) ~ ¢2 where ¢2 is multivariate normal with dimension 2. Then, 
it follows that: 
Using these relationships one can write fijt as a function of !Jt,16 
rvC rvr 
f i jt = !Jt + O"c Cl!i + O"r ai ln(rjt). (1.12) 
First, an initial guess is made for fjt and~- For each draw from the multivariate normal ¢2 , 
fijt and Oit are computed using equations (12) and (5), respectively. Then, the computed values 
of fijt and Oit are used to estimate the coefficients of evolution of in (1) and (8) .With these 
coefficients, the transition matrices are constructed for the endowment utility and the inclusive 
value, respectively. Once the transition matrices are constructed, they are used to calculate 
the expectation Bellman in (7). This procedure is repeated until convergence. When there is 
convergence, the computed values of Oit and Oijt are used to calculate the predicted probability 
of purchase Sijt and market shares Bjt· Since the inside loop is run given an initial guess of fjt 
and ~' the resulting market share Bjt is a function of these initial guesses.l 7 
The middle loop uses a BLP type fixed point equation to get fjt(~). More specifically, using 
the predicted markets shares Sjt(fjt, ~) from the inside loop and the observed market shares 
from data, Sjt, the following equation is run until convergence. 
(1.13) 
16 Please r efer to Appendix l.B for the derivation. 
17 For the iterative calculation, the state space (f;;t , .S;t) is discretized into evenly-spaced bins. /;;t is discretized 
into 21 bins, Oit into 50 bins. 
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In equation (13), \{!is a tuning parameter that is set to 1- {3. In practice, the inside loop and 
the middle loop are run jointly before moving on the the outer loop, and is henceforth called the 
main loop. Illustration A1 in the Appendix displays a visual summary of the main loop. Full 
convergence of the main loop is required before moving on to the outside loop. An important 
issue here is the uniqueness of the result. More specifically, to ensure the identification of the 
model main loop needs to have a unique fixed point. This paper does not provide a formal proof 
of uniqueness, however, in practice I ran many trials and never had a problem of multiple of 
solutions. 
Finally, the outside loop specifies a GMM objective function and performs a search over 
parameters that minimize this objective function. More specifically, taking fjt(:E) estimated in 
the middle loop, the following regression is run (using an instrumental variable (IV) regression 
to deal with the endogeneity of the interest rate).l8 
j = l...k 
The regression estimates the vector of mean consumer tastes {X x , one of the main para-
meters of interest . It also estimates the set of unobserved product characteristics, or errors, 
1\ 
~jt(E) for j = l...Jt. Using the estimated errors, a GMM criterion function is formed, 
where z is a matrix of exogenous variables and instruments , which are described in the subsection 
18 The endogeneity problem and the instruments used is discussed in det ail in the subsection entit led 
"Instruments". 
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4.2.2. Parameter ~ is then estimated by minimizing the following objective function, 
1\ (~) argmin { G(~)'WG(~)}, 
(:E) 
argmin {(~jt(~)' z)'W(~jt(~)' z)}, 
(:E) 
where W is a weighting matrix. In practice, the minimization is performed by a non-linear search 
over the parameter ~ . Specifically, a two-stage search is executed in order to get asymptotically 
efficient estimates. The first stage lets W = ( z' z) -l, and the second stage uses the first stage 
estimates to compute the optimal weighting matrix. 
Estimating the Switching Cost 
To estimate the fixed switching cost, an extra micro moment is added to the GMM objective 
function in the outer loop. Specifically, a non-linear search is performed for the parameter value 
T that makes the average of structural switching probabilities (Sjt_ave) computed in equation 
(11) equal to its observed counterpart. 19 
The observed probability is taken from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, which was con-
ducted for three months in 1999 (June, July, August) and covered 1500 distinct households. 
Households with either a checking or savings account were asked to specify the depository insti-
tution where they hold their most frequently used checking account as their main bank. Then, 
they were asked the number of years they had been with their main bank. Kiser (2002) reports 
that the median duration with main bank is 10 years. This finding is used to construct the 
observed probability. Specifically, the median duration of 10 years is converted into Pobs = 1/10 
which implies a 10% probability of switching at a given year. Then, a search is performed for 
the value ofT that makes the observed probability Pobs equal to the average structural switching 
19 Ho (2009) follows a similar approach to estimate the switching cost. 
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probability S1t ave· 
Instruments 
One of the bank characteristics, the deposit interest rate, can potentially be endogenous in the 
sense that it might be correlated with the unobserved bank characteristics. To allow for this 
possibility, the deposit interest rate is treated as endogenous and a set of instruments are used 
for identification in the estimation procedure. In constructing the instruments, a natural place 
to start is to consider using the two sets of BLP (1995) type instruments. However, this is 
not entirely possibly due to the nature of the data. Specifically, the sum of characteristics of 
other products owned by the firm can not be used since a bank has only one product in my 
model. Consequently, this paper uses the second set of BLP (1995) instruments. Specifically, 
the instruments are constructed as the sum of the characteristics of other banks at timet. First, 
for a given characteristic x, the sum for all banks present in time t is computed as follows. 
J, 
total Xt = LXjt 
j=l 
fort = l...T. 
Then, the instrument is constructed as the sum in timet minus the bank's own observation, 
iv_Xjt=totalxt-Xjt Vj , t. 
Overall, this procedure constructs a total of 6 instruments for each of the exogenous bank 
characteristics: number of branches, average distance, number of employees, deposits per branch, 
age and assets of the bank. In practice, this set of instruments cannot be used without a 
transformation since they are colinear with the year fixed effects. To ensure proper identification, 
the squared values of the instruments are used in the estimations. 
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1.5 Results 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 present two set of results with and without switching costs. Specifically, in 
Table 1.3, switching costs are assumed to be zero, so that there is no particular cost to switching 
at any time. On the other hand, in Table 1.4, the switching cost is a parameter to be estimated. 
As the model practically becomes the same as a static model when the switching cost is ignored, 
one can refer to the model in Table 1.3 as the static model, and Tablel.4 as the dynamic model. 
Results in Table 1.3 show that consumers still care about the number of branches a bank 
has and the average distance to those branches. The positive and significant coefficient of 0.0267 
on branches shows that market share of a bank responds positively to having more branches. 
Moreover, the effect of branches on market shares is decreasing through time. Except for the 
years 2008 and 2009, the coefficients on the year-branch interactions are negative, implying that 
more branches increases market shares less in 2002 to 2007 with respect to the effect in 2001. 
Proximity to branches also matters. The negative and significant coefficient of -0.0077 on 
the distance variable implies banks with branches that are closer to consumers on average have 
higher market shares. 
The coefficient on the interest rate (apr) is rather small and not significant. This is quite 
unexpected since it implies consumers are not price sensitive. Judging from the overall picture 
presented by the static model in Table 1.3, one way to explain why people don't switch banks is 
that they don't care about prices too much. This is merely due to ignoring the switching costs 
which are crucial for consumer decisions. Once we allow for switching costs and estimate the full 
model in Table 1.4, we see that there is indeed a massive increase in the price coefficient and it 
becomes highly significant. People are indeed very price sensitive. Comparing the static model 
results with the dynamic ones reveals that ignoring the switching cost leads the static model to 
underestimate the price sensitivity of consumers to deposit interest rates. This difference in the 
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Table 1.3: Estimates of Mean Consumer Tastes (Static Model) 
Bank characteristics 
variable coefficient 
ln(apr) 0.5277 
(1.1730) 
branches 0.0267 .. 
(0.0115) 
distance -0.0077·· · 
(0.0029) 
ln(age) 0.309 ... 
(0.0938) 
assets 0.0258 .. 
(0.0127) 
assets2 -1.259 E-5* 
(0.765 E-5) 
employee -0.1068 ... 
(0.0216) 
deposits per branch 0.0745 ... 
(0.017) 
# observations 
Interactions 
variable 
branches*2002 
branches *2003 
branches*2004 
branches*2005 
branches*2006 
branches *2007 
branches*2008 
branches*2009 
1600 
coefficient 
-0.0036 
(0.0156) 
-O.ot05 
(0.0144) 
-0.0133 
(0.0140) 
-0.0166 
(0.0133) 
-0.0193 
(0.0146) 
-0.0186 
(0.0142) 
0.0424 .. 
(0.0213) 
0.0321 
(0.0218) 
Notes: estimation includes year fixed effects 
standard errors are in paranthesis 
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Table 1.4: Estimates of Mean Consumer Tastes (Dynamic Model) 
Bank characteristics Interactions 
variable coefficient variable coefficient 
In( apr) 1.0420··· branches*2002 -0.0022 
(0.3589) (0.0166) 
branches 0.0291·· branches *2003 -0.0104 
(0.0120) (0.0149) 
distance -0.0092··· branches *2004 -0.0135 
(0.0033) (0.0149) 
In( age) 0.3206··· branches*2005 -0.0169 
(0.1194) (0.0143) 
assets 0.0283··· branches*2006 -0.0198 
(0.0075) (0.0151) 
assets2 -1.377 E-5*** branches*2007 -0.0194 
(0.407 E-5) (0.0150) 
employee -0.1172··· branches*2008 0.0514 .. 
(0.0339) (0.0204) 
deposits per branch 0.0821··· branches*2009 0.0422 .. 
(0.0212) (0.0211) 
switching cost 
tau 4.1420 
(8.7854) 
# observations 1600 
Notes: estimation includes year fiXed effects 
standard errors are in paranthesis 
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estimates of the price coefficient shows how important it is to consider the full model with the 
switching costs, which is only possible in a dynamic setting. 
The estimate for the switching cost is quite large in magnitude relative to the coefficient 
estimates on other bank characteristics. In comparison to the coefficient on ln( apr), switching 
costs are equivalent to about having a 3.98% increase in deposit interest rates. This is an 
important finding since it implies that people will not switch banks for a higher interest rate in 
another bank unless the difference is more than 3.98%. 
1.5.1 Marginal Effects 
It is important to note that the estimated coefficients in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 do not represent 
the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on market shares since the underlying model 
is a logit model. As the main focus of the paper is to analyze how the impact of branches on 
market shares changes over time, it is very important to estimate the marginal effects of branches 
over the sample period. Using the properties of the logit distribution, the elasticity of a given 
characteristic Xjt with respect to market shares, Sjt, is computed as 
'T/jt 
8Sjt Xjt 
8Xjt. Sit 
where f3 is the estimated coefficient on the particular characteristic Xjt presented in Table 
1.4. Specifically, the branch elasticity for a given year is computed as follows, where (3 0 is the 
estimated coefficient on explanatory variable 11 branches 11 , and f3t is the estimated coefficient on 
the branch-year interaction term for year t. 
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It is important to note that elasticities computed in this manner are short-run elasticities 
ignoring the dynamic nature of the model. In this sense, they can be regarded as static elasticities 
that represent the marginal effect of certain characteristics on market shares at a given time. 
F igure 1.9 shows the computed branch elasticities with respect to market shares from 2001 
to 2009. Having one more branches seems to increase market share of a bank by about 10-20% 
throughout most of the sample period. From 2001 to 2007, the marginal impact of branches 
F igure 1 ·9: Branch Elasticity by Year 
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declines consistently which is in line with the motivation of the paper. There is a big jump 
in 2008 that is quite unexpected. One possible explanation for this might be the fact that it 
coincides with the financial crisis of 2008. It might be the case that as consumers started to 
lose confidence in the system and financial institutions, they started to value human interaction 
more which is found in traditional branches. 
Figure 1.10 shows the computed distance elasticities with respect to market shares. Being one 
mile closer to consumers on average increases market share of a bank by about 35%. The marginal 
impact of distance declines steadily throughout the sample period, however, the magnitude of the 
decline is not as pronounced as the one of branches. Intuitively, it implies that consumers value 
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Figure 1-10: Distance Elasticity by Year 
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distance to branches consistently over the years, even though they seem to value the number of 
branches less. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Many experts have noted the importance of branching as the primary method for commercial 
banks to grow during the past decade. Today, however , branching may be decreasing in impor-
tance due to the widespread use of Internet banking. This paper develops a structural dynamic 
model of consumer demand for bank deposits to empirically determine whether branches re-
main to be a significant factor for consumers today. The model draws on the techniques of 
Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2011) where consumers make a discrete choice from a set of banks 
every period in a multinomial logit framework. Consumer utility depends on bank characteris-
tics. Every period, the consumer chooses the option that maximizes the sum of discounted value 
of future expected utilities conditional on the information she has. If the consumer decides to 
switch banks at a given period, she incurs a fixed switching cost. The main goal of the model 
is to estimate the consumer taste parameters on observable bank characteristics and changes in 
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consumer welfare due to evolving bank characteristics. 
The paper contributes to the literature on demand estimation in the banking industry, most 
of which uses static models, by developing a dynamic demand model. The use of dynamics is 
crucial since any static model that ignores the switching costs will result in unrealistic coefficient 
estimates for the consumer parameters of interest. In addition, it extends the literature on 
estimation of dynamic demand by differing from the methodology of Gowrisankaran and Rysman 
(2011) in three aspects; (i) consumer's utility of the same product evolves over time, (ii) it 
allows for the estimation of the switching cost , and (iii) product characteristics are time-varying. 
Even though previous work has handled one or two of these extensions separately, this paper 
implements all three extensions together in the same setting. 
The model is estimated using yearly data for all commercial banks in Massachusetts from 
2001 to 2009. Findings show that branching still matters. Even after controlling for bank 
characteristics such as deposit interest rates, age and size of the bank, market share of a bank 
responds positively to having more branches and the effect is significant. However, the effect of 
branches on market shares seems to be decreasing over time. Having more branches increases 
market shares less in most years in the sample period with respect to the effect in 2001. Proximity 
to branches also matters. Banks with branches that are closer to consumers on average have 
higher market shares. 
The fixed cost incurred in switching banks is found to be crucial in the consumer's decision 
problem. The estimated switching cost is equivalent to about having a 4% increase in deposit 
interest rates. Intuitively, the finding implies that people will not switch banks for a higher 
interest rate in another bank unless the difference is more than 4%. Moreover, comparing the 
static model results with the dynamic ones reveals that ignoring the switching cost leads the static 
model to underestimate the price sensitivity of consumers. Accordingly, one can conclude that 
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it is crucial to consider the switching cost in a dynamic setting in order to get more reasonable 
coefficient estimates. 
The paper also computes the actual change in consumer welfare in the sample period along 
with two other counterfactuals. Findings show that average consumer welfare was 4.19% higher in 
2009 compared to 2001. Estimating two counterfactual scenarios reveals that both the change in 
the number of branches and the average distance to consumers have been beneficial to consumers. 
The rather large difference between the estimates for the two counterfactuals shows that distance 
to branches affects consumer welfare more than the number of branches. 
The research presented in this paper can potentially be extended further. Possible future work 
includes the re-definition of the market. Specifically, the market definition could be modified 
to construct smaller markets at the county level. The re-definition of the markets shouldn't 
change the findings significantly since a very detailed distance measure is used in the estimations. 
However, this could serve as a further robustness check. 
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1. 7 Appendix I. A 
Figure 1 ·11: Summary of the Estimation Routine 
t l 
Transition Matrices 
I Market Shares 
t. 
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Figure 1·12: Number of Employees per Branch in the US 
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Table Al: Variables Used 
Variable Description Item source Notes 
ban kid FRB Bank id number SOD Unique number assigned by the Federal Reserve Board to identify 
the entity 
fdic fdic certificate number SOD Unique number assigned by the FDIC to identify institutions and 
for the issuance of insurance certificates. 
charter OCC id number SOD (OCC) to all entities to which it grants a charter. 
docket OTS docket number SOD 
Docket number assigned by the Office of Thrtft Supervision (OTS) 
routing routing number SOD Primary ABA routing number 
name bank name SOD 
address bank address SOD 
city bank city SOD 
zip bank zip SOD 
type bank filing type SOD 
quarter quarter of year, 1 to 4 SOD 
periodenddate reporting period end date SOD 
netinc net income ID Net interest income plus total noninterest income plus realized 
gains (losses) on securities and extraordinary items, less total 
noninterest expense 
offdom number of domestic offices ID 
The number of domestic offices (including headquarters) operated 
by active institutions in the US territories and possesions 
estymd established Date ID The date on which the institution began operations 
age age of the bank year-established year Measure of experience 
asset total assets rcon21 70 (Call) Total assets of the institution (measure of size) 
deposits total deposits rcon2200 (Call) 
Equals the sum of ~tota l transaction accounts•, "total 
nontransaction accounts(includeing MMDAs), and the sum of 
noninterest bearing deposits and interest-bearing deposits (Call) 
int_exp_sav interest expense on saving deposits riad0093 (Call) 
int_loans interest and fee income on loans, total riad401 0 (Call) 
int_exp total interest expense riad4073 (Call) 
net_int_inc net interest income riad407 4 (Call) 
Total interest income, plus the tax benefit on tax-exempt income, 
less total interest expense, divided by average assets 
sercharge service charges riad4080 (Call) service charges on deposit accounts 
tot_int_inc total interest income riad41 07(Call) 
All income from eaming assets plus the tax benefit on tax-exempt 
loans, leases, and municipal securities, divided by average assets 
employees number of employees riad4150 (Call) Number of full time equivalent employees 
int_exp_for interest expense on foreign deposits riad4172(Cal l) Interest expense on deposits in foreign offices, edge and 
aggreement subsidiaries and ibfs 
dep_for total foreign deposits rcfn2200 (Call) Equals the sum of total transaction accounts, total nontransaction 
accounts(including MMDAs), and the sum of non interest bearing 
deoistis, and interest bearing deposits 
int_for_loans interest income on foreign loans riad4059 (Call) Interest and fee income on loans in foreign offices, edge and 
agreement subsidiaries and ibfs 
rate semi-annual interest rate on domestic deposi int_exp_dom I dep_dom 
apr annual interest rate on domestic deposits (1+rate)'2-1 
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1.8 Appendix l.B 
This appendix derives the relationship between fiit and fit.Let 
,-....,~ r-..J c rv r 
Oi = ( O!i , O!i ) '"'"' (h 
where (h is multivariate normal with dimension 2. Then it follows that: 
Using these relationships one can write 8~t as a function of Ujt, oi) : 
fijt = afXjt + E: jt 
afconstant ai ln(rjt) 
= accons tan t +(I ln(aprit) + ax2 X2 + ... + axk Xk + E:jt+L:112&'icons tan t+I:112 &'i ln(aprjt) 
1-'ijt 7r ijt 
* * fijt = fjt + J.Lijt + 11"ijt * * 
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Chapter 2 
Consumer Welfare in the Banking Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
Another question of interest regarding the changes in the banking industry after the deregulation 
is the impact of the changes in certain bank characteristics on consumer welfare. The change 
in the structure of the industry was not limited to the few years following the deregulation. 
The industry structure and the characteristics of the average bank has been steadily changing, 
especially over the past decade. More specifically, there was an increase in the number of branches 
of a given bank, and the average distance of these branches to consumers declined. The purpose 
of this paper is to measure the impact of these changes on consumer welfare in the sample period 
of 2001 to 2009. Specifically, the paper computes the actual change in consumer welfare during 
the sample period, and then analyzes how the increasing number of branches and decreasing 
distance of these branches to consumers impacted consumer welfare. 
One of the advantages of using a structural model as the one used in Chapter I is that it allows 
for the computation of consumer welfare. This chapter will be using the parameter estimates 
from the structural model in Chapter I to compute the actual change in consumer welfare, as well 
as the change under two counterfactual scenarios. Specifically, the first counterfactual considers 
the hypothetical case where the number of branches of each bank stayed the same at their 2001 
values. The goal here is to estimate the level of consumer welfare in 2009 if banks had the same 
number of branches as in 2001. The second counterfactual considers the scenario under which 
the average distance of branches to consumers stayed the same at their 2001 values. 
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The literature on analyzing consumer welfare in the banking industry is not as vast as in 
other areas. The paper that 's most closely related to my work is Dick (2007). Similar to this 
paper, Dick (2007) develops a structural model of demand for bank deposits in order to measure 
the effect of the changes on consumer welfare. This paper differs from Dick (2007) in two main 
aspects. First , it analyzes the effects of recent changes in the industry, from 2001 to 2009, as 
opposed to the period right after the deregulation. Second, it allows the consumer utility to 
depend on the distance to bank's branches, which plays a crucial role in consumer welfare. 
Welfare estimates are computed using the same data set as in Chapter I. Specifically, the 
paper uses yearly bank level data for all commercial banks in Massachusetts from 2001 to 2009. 
Bank level data comes from three main sources: the Summary of Deposits (SOD), the Institution 
Directory for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Consolidated Reports 
of Condition and Income (Call Reports). 
Results show that average consumer welfare was 4.19% higher in 2009 compared to 2001. 
Estimation of two counterfactual scenarios reveals that both the change in the number of branches 
and the average distance to consumers have been beneficial to consumers. Estimates show that 
consumer welfare would have been lower than what it is today if the number of branches stayed 
the same or if the average distance to consumers stayed the same at their 2001 values. Specifically, 
if the number of branches stayed the same, the rise in consumer welfare would only have been 
3.30%. Similarly, if the average distance to consumers stayed the same, the rise in consumer 
welfare would have been a mere 1.05%. The rather large difference between the estimates for the 
two counterfactuals shows that average distance to branches affects consumer welfare more than 
the number of branches. Accordingly, given a choice between having more branches or relocating 
the existing ones so that they are closer to consumers, the consumers would prefer the second 
alternative. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides information about 
the data and the industry trends; Section 2.3 describes the welfare computation; Section 2.4 
presents the results and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Data and the Industry Trends 
The data set used is an unbalanced panel for all commercial banks in Massachusetts from 2001 
to 2009. It has 1600 observations at the bank-year level for 209 unique banks (For more detailed 
information about the data set and variable construction please refer to Section 1.3.). 
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During the sample period of 2001 to 2009, the industry experienced certain changes of inter-
est. First, both the total number of branches (Figure 2.1) and the average number of branches 
per bank (Figure 2.2) increased in Massachusetts. In 2000, a given bank had about 8 branches 
on average and this number rose to 12 branches in 2009. Second, the average distance of these 
branches to consumers decreased by about 2 miles (Figure 2.3). The goal of this chapter is to 
estimate how these changes in the number of branches and the distance of branches to consumers 
have impacted consumer welfare. 
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Figure 2 ·2: Average Number of Branches per Bank in Massachusetts 
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Figure 2·3: Average Distance of Median Bank to Consumers 
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2.3 Welfare Computation 
This section explains how the welfare is computed for a specific period. Welfare at a given 
period depends on the characteristics of the entire choice set of banks present in that period. 
Specifically, the welfare for each type of consumer i at a given time t is computed as 
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where Xjt is the vector of observed characteristics of bank j at time t, and ax is the vector of 
estimated coefficients on these bank characteristics. The parameter estimates of ax are taken 
from the structural estimation in Chapter I. bit(Xjt , ax) is the inclusive value of the entire 
choice set of banks at timet defined by equation (1.5), and ci denotes the elasticity of demand 
for consumer i with respect to the interest rate, apr.1 
Average consumer welfare across ns consumers is then computed by taking the average of 
individual welfare functions: 
For the purpose of this chapter, the first question of interest is the change in average consumer 
welfare between two time periods, namely 2001 and 2009. Formally, the actual difference in 
average welfare between 2001 and 2009 is measured as 
The second goal of the paper is to estimate what the average welfare would have been in 2009 
under two hypothetical cases: 1) if the number of branches of each bank stayed the same at their 
2001 values; 2) if the average distance of branches to consumers stayed the same at their 2001 
values. To compute these hypothetical values of welfare, the structural model in Chapter I is 
estimated twice using two different vectors of bank characteristics Xj2009 and Xj'2009.All values 
of the vector Xj2009 is the same as Xj2009 except the number of branches. Xj2009 assigns each 
bank the number of branches it had back in 2001. Similai-ly, all values of the vector Xj2009 is 
the same as Xj2009 except the average distance. Xj'2009 assigns each bank its average distance 
1The elasticity is approximated by the individual coefficient estimates on apr, ar. 
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back in 2001. Finally, the hypothetical changes in consumer welfare is computed as 
II ( II x
11 
) ( X) Ll W = W X 12009 , a - W X12001> a . 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.1 shows the actual and counterfactual changes in consumer welfare between 2001 and 
2009. Findings show that actual consumer welfare was 4.19% higher in 2009 compared to its value 
in 2001. The remainder of Table 2.1 present the estimated change under the two counterfactual 
scenarios. 
Table 2.1: Consumer Welfare Estimates 
Actual (11W) 
Counterfactual 1 (11W') 
# branches stayed the same 
Counterfactual 2 (11W") 
distance stayed the same 
Percentage change in 
average welfare 2001-2009 
4 .19 
3.30 
1.05 
The first counterfactual considers the hypothetical case where the number of branches of 
each bank stayed the same at its 2001 values. The goal here is to estimate the level of consumer 
welfare in 2009 if banks had the same number of branches as in 2001. Estimates show that 
consumer welfare would have been lower than it's actual value in 2009 if the number of branches 
stayed the same. Compared to the actual 4.19% rise in welfare, there would have been a smaller 
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increase measured by 3.30%. Accordingly, one can conclude that the change in the number of 
branches between the years 2001 and 2009 have been beneficial for consumer welfare. 
The second counterfactual considers the scenario under which the average distance of branches 
to consumers stayed the same at its 2001 values. Estimates show that consumer welfare would 
have been lower than it's actual value in 2009 under this scenario as well. Compared to the 
actual 4.19% rise in welfare, the increase would have been only a mere 1.05%. The rather large 
difference between the estimates for Counterfactual1 and Counterfactual 2 indicate that average 
distance to branches affects consumer welfare more than the number of branches. This finding 
has certain policy implications. Specifically, it implies that given a choice between having more 
branches or relocating the existing ones so that they are closer to consumers, the consumers 
would prefer the second alternative. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The changes in the banking industry were not limited to the few years following the deregulation. 
The industry structure and the characteristics of the average bank has been steadily changing. 
Specifically, there was an increase in the number of branches of a given bank, and the average 
distance of these branches to consumers declined over the past decade. In 2000, a given bank 
had about 8 branches on average and this number rose to 12 branches in 2009. The average 
distance of these branches to consumers decreased by about 2 miles in the same period. This 
paper measures the impact of these changes on consumer welfare in the sample period of 2001 
to 2009. 
First, the paper computes the actual change in consumer welfare from 2001 to 2009 using 
the parameter estimates from the structural model in Chapter I. Second, it analyzes how the 
increasing number of branches and decreasing average distance of these branches to consumers 
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impacted consumer welfare using counterfactual analysis. The first counterfactual considers the 
hypothetical case where the number of branches of each bank stayed the same at its 2001 values. 
The second counterfactual considers the scenario under which the average distance of branches 
to consumers stayed the same at its 2001 values. 
Estimates show that average consumer welfare was 4.19% higher in 2009 compared to 2001. 
Estimation of the counterfactual scenarios reveals that both the increase in the number of 
branches and the decrease in average distance to consumers have been beneficial to consumers. 
Specifically, the finding is that consumer welfare would have been lower than what it is today if 
the number of branches stayed the same or if the average distance to consumers stayed the same 
at their 2001 values. Moreover, the rather large difference between the estimates for the two 
counterfactuals shows that average distance to branches affects consumer welfare more than the 
number of branches. Accordingly, given a choice between having more branches or relocating 
the existing ones so that they are closer to consumers, the consumers would prefer the second 
alternative. 
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Chapter 3 
Internet Use, Prices and Market Structure in Yellow 
Pages Advertising 
3.1 Introduction 
The rapid expansion of Internet use at the turn of the 21st century brought with it a new medium 
of commerce. An important economic question has been the extent of competition created by 
the online retail sector. The spread of e-commerce in a particular industry influences both 
equilibrium prices and the market structure in that industry. While there is a large empirical 
literature studying howe-commerce has affected prices in a given market (e.g. Brynjolfsson & 
Smith (2000), Brown & Goolsbee (2002) , Goolsbee (2001), Prince (2007)) , much less work has 
focused on how the diffusion of the Internet has affected the number of producers and the general 
market structure (e.g. Emre, Hortacsu & Syverson (2006), Forman, Ghose & Goldfarb (2009)) . 
In contrast to most of the empirical literature before, the goal of this paper is to estimate how 
the diffusion of the Internet has affected prices in addition to the market structure in a particular 
market, namely printed Yellow Pages (YP) advertising. 
According theoretic models , the expansion of Internet use among general public is expected 
to decrease the number of printed YP directories , hence the level of competition in the printed 
YP advertising market. However, it is not clear how the rising Internet use will affect the prices 
of the printed YP advertisements. The reason is that as the Internet is more commonly used, 
the demand for printed YP advertisements falls. In addition, as putting an advertisement online 
becomes a very attractive alternative for firms instead of putting an advertisement in a print 
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Yellow Pages directory, the supply of printed YP directories might also fall. A web page such as 
yellowpages.com gets around 140 million monthly searches and provides the most basic listing 
virtually for free. 1 Under these circumstances, online advertising is expected to decrease the 
quantity of printed YP advertisements, however, the effect on prices is ambiguous as it depends 
on the relative changes in demand and supply of printed YP advertisements. In this paper, our 
main goal is to address these questions empirically. 
YP advertising market is a particularly interesting market to study the effects of Internet 
diffusion. Most industries that have been studied before, such as the markets for books or 
CD's, are leisure type industries. In these industries, the Internet serves as a substitute to the 
traditional retail option in two ways: the first is that the Internet can provide the same service, 
the second is that since the Internet is a leisure activity itself, it might decrease your participation 
in the original leisure activity. For instance, in the case of Emre, Hortacsu & Syverson (2006) 
that looks at book stores, the Internet diffusion affects off-line bookstores because 1) people can 
buy books on-line instead, and 2) because people might stop reading books because they spend 
more time surfing the Internet , reading online. Usually, the authors ignore how the Internet 
affects the off-line sector through the second channel and act as if the only effect is due to the 
first channel. In our case, the second channel does not constitute an issue since searching for a 
YP advertising is not a leisure activity. In YP advertising, the Internet serves as a substitute to 
the traditional retail option only by providing the same service. 
There has been many theoretical papers proposing models of consumer substitution between 
online and traditional retail sectors (Alba et al. (1997), Bakos (1997), Balasubramanian (1998), 
Pan et al. (2002), Lal and Sarvary (1999), Viswanathan (2005), Chun and Kim (2005), Guo 
and Liu (2008)). Empirical work on the subject is relatively more difficult to find since data 
1 Total combined searches from YELLOWPAGES.COM network internal site statistics, June 2008. 
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on Internet use or sales tend to be scarce. Recent empirical literature studying the effects of 
e-commerce on prices include Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000), Brown & Goolsbee (2002), Goolsbee 
(2001), Ellison & Ellison (2006), Prince (2007). Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000) study the markets 
for books and CD's, and find that prices on the Internet are 9 to 16% lower than prices in 
conventional outlets. Goolsbee (2001) and Prince (2007) both examine the market for personal 
computers. Using data on computer purchases of more than 20,000 people, Goolsbee estimates 
the extent to which retail price influences the probability of buying online. Similarly, Prince 
(2007) measures cross-price elasticity for online and retail personal computers. A different branch 
of the literature studies how the diffusion of the Internet has affected the market structure. 
Emre, Hortacsu & Syverson (2006) examine the travel agencies and bookstores to conclude that 
increases in purchases made using the Internet are linked to declines in the number of small 
firms. Forman, Ghose & Goldfarb (2009) use data from Amazon.com on top-selling books and 
find that when a store opens locally, people substitute away from online purchasing, suggesting 
that transportation costs matter. 
The two papers that are most closely related to our research are Rysman (2004) and Busse & 
Rysman (2005). Both of these papers empirically analyze price discrimination and competition 
in the printed YP advertising market. In contrast, the main goal here is to examine the effects 
of Internet use on the prices and competition in the YP advertising market. 
The data set used is at the directory level and it covers 2170 printed directories in total. It is 
constructed from three main sources. Price data for the printed advertisements comes from the 
Rate and Data publication of the Yellow Pages Publishers Association (YPPA) . The Internet 
use data comes from the CPS Internet Use Supplement 2007, and demographic data for the 
distribution areas comes from the Decennial Census of 1990 and 2000. 
The primary finding is that rising Internet use leads to a significant increase in printed adver-
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tising prices. More specifically, we find that a one percentage increase in the use of the Internet 
among the public in a directory's coverage area leads to about 10.6% increase in advertising 
prices in that particular directory. When we allow for intragroup correlation within each Core 
Based Statistical Area (CBSA), the estimates remain to be significant. This result implies that 
the reduction in the supply of printed YP advertisements due to the expansion of the Internet 
is greater relative to the decrease in demand for these advertisements, leading to an increase in 
prices. 
Next, we find that Internet use does indeed lead to a reduction in the number of printed 
directories and publishers, hence the level of competition, at the zipcode level. One percentage 
increase in Internet use at a given zipcode leads to a 29.7% decrease in the number of publishers 
at that zipcode, which corresponds to about a decrease of one publisher per zipcode (-0.748). 
However, the coefficients lose their significance once we allow for intragroup correlation at the 
CBSA level. To some extent, this loss of significance is due to the nature of the Internet use 
data available. The CPS supplement provides Internet use data only at the CBSA level; the 
estimates would probably have survived the clustering and remained significant if the Internet 
use data were available at the zipcode level. 
Another question of interest is how the expanding use of Internet affects directories with 
different publishers differently. We find that the number of directories published by big tele-
phone companies have decreased with expanding use of Internet, whereas the ones by smaller 
independent publishers seems to have increased. An intuitive explanation of the result might 
be that since big telephone company publishers are associated closely with online yellowpages 
sites, they give less emphasis to their printed directories with the expanding use of the Internet, 
hence decrease their number of printed directories. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 gives an overview of the print Yellow 
51 
Pages directory industry, section 3.3 is devoted to summarizing the data, section 3.4 explains the 
details of the estimation, section 3.5 presents the results and section 3.6 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Industry Overview 
Printed Yellow Pages directories remain an important $14 billion per year industry according 
to the latest industry study done in 2004.2 Most publishers publish directories yearly and 
distribute them for free. There are three groups of publishing companies: independent publishers, 
independent telephone companies and Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). In 1983, 
the original AT&T Corp.'s local operations were split into seven independent RBOCs as a result 
of an antitrust suit. The number of RBOCs has shrunk through mergers since then from seven 
to just three: Verizon, CenturyLink and AT&T Inc.3 Utility publishers are the ones associated 
with a telephone company, either an RBOC or an independent local telephone company (Busse 
& Rysman (2005)). 
Directories published by utility publishers ('utility directories') tend to dominate their mar-
kets, even though they face some competition from independent ones. Independent publishers 
print 23% of the directories in this data set as shown in Table 3.1 . 
Table 3.1: Utility Publishers vs. Independents 
Total# of directories 2170 
#of utility 1665 (77%) 
#of independent 505 (23%) 
Utility directories tend to dominate the markets in terms of prices as well. The overall 
average price for a double quarter-column ( dqc) advertisement was $1 ,641 in 2007. If we look 
at the utility and independent directories separately, we can see that the average price for a dqc 
2 J ane D ennison-Bauer, From Phone Books to MySpace: Assessing the Complete Y P Universe, Knowledge 
Networks, fall /winter 2007. 
3 Source: Network World Research Center. 
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advertisement in a utility directory was $1775, whereas it was only $1200 for an independent 
one. 
The Yellow Pages advertising plays an important role for purchases; hence it is crucial for 
local businesses. A 2004 usage study shows that , after the average YP reference, almost nine in 
ten (86 %) users had already made their planned purchase or were likely to do so.4 Moreover, 
the rate of reference to YP is also impressive. Among the consumers using a moving company 
in 2004, 60 percent referred to the Yellow Pages. 
Recent research studies suggest that the print Yellow Pages will coexist with electronic shop-
ping alternatives for the immediate future. 5 For example, among the 31 percent of consumers 
who shopped on the Internet in the average month in 2004, 80 percent also indicated referring to 
the print Yellow Pages in the past thirty days. 6 However, coexistence does not in any way imply 
that the print industry will be unaffected by the emerging online alternatives. The Internet is 
changing consumers' expectations about information availability, which will deeply impact the 
print Yellow Pages. The main goal of this paper is to quantify this impact. 
3.3 D ata 
The final data set used is at the directory level and it covers 2170 directories in total. At 
the directory level, I have five categories of advertising prices depending on the size of the 
advertisement (quarter column, double quarter column, double half column, half page and full 
page) for years 1996 and 2007. I have detailed demographic information about the distribution 
area of each directory, such as total population, urban population, high school graduation rate 
and college graduation rate for both years. I have three measures of competition each directory 
4 Source: Knowledge Networks/ SRI, YPA Industry Usage Study 2004. 
5 Burt Michaels, Putting a 21st-Century Spin on a Powerful Selling Vehicle, Knowledge Networks, 
spring/ summer 2005 . 
6 Source: Knowledge Networks/ SRI, YPA Industry Usage Study 2004 . 
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faces (defined in the next section), again for years 1996 and 2007. Finally, I have the percentage 
of average Internet use in 2007 for each directory's distribution area. 
Original price data comes from Rate and Data publication of the Yellow Pages Publishers 
Association (YPPA), and the distribution area information (including population data at the 
5-digit zip code level) comes from Claritas Inc. that collects distribution areas as maps. De-
mographic data comes from the most relevant Census (1990 Census for 1996 YP data and 2000 
Census for 2007 YP data). Finally, the Internet use data is constructed using the CPS Internet 
Use Supplement 2007. 
The data construction subsection that follows explains in detail the process of constructing 
the final data set. The descriptive statistics for the key variables used are also found at the end 
of the data construction subsection. 
3.3.1 Data Construction 
Yellow Pages Directory Data 
Yellow Pages directory data for 1996 was constructed by Busse & Rysman (2005) for their paper 
on price discrimination in the industry. I use their 1996 data set and construct a similar data 
set for the year 2007. 
From the original Claritas Inc. data, I know the zipcodes that each directory serves and 
I know the demographic information for these zip codes. First, using this distribution data, 
I construct directory-level demographic information as a population-weighted average of the 
zipcodes served. 
Second, I construct three measures of competition each directory faces, weighted by the 
population. Following Busse & Rysman (2005) methodology, I construct the following variables 
in each directory i 's distribution area: 
• avgdir: # of competing directories 
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• avgdirc: # of competing directories owned by a competing publisher 
• avgpub: # of competing publishers 
More specifically, for each directory i, I calculate the population-weighted average number of 
competing directories as, 
(3.1) 
where z denotes zipcode, Zi denotes the set of zipcodes directory i serves, #CDz is the 
number of competing directories in zipcode z,and Popz is the population of the zipcode. Ni is 
the number of people who receive directory i, and can be evaluated as Ni = 2::= Popz. 
zEZ; 
For the distribution area of each directory i, average number of directories owned by a 
competing publisher (avgdirc} and the average number of competing publishers (avgpub) are 
computed similarly, 
d . L (#CDzj * Popz ) avg ~rCi = N 
zEZ; jEJ; 2 
b L (#CPz * Popz ) avgpu i = Ni zEZ; 
(3 .2) 
(3.3) 
where Ji is the set of directories that have different publishers than the publisher of directory 
~, #CDzj is the number of competing directories in zipcode z with a publisher different than 
the publisher of directory i, and #CPz is the number of competing publishers in in zipcode z . 
At this point, the construction of the Yellow Pages directory data for 2007 is complete. As 
can be seen in Table 3.2, there are many directory codes that did not exist in 1996 but do exist 
in 2007. Since I am interested in the change in prices/competition between the two years, the 
new directories in 2007 becomes irrelevant. All of the 4983 directory codes in 1996 also appear 
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in 2007. Consequently, the final Yellow Pages data set includes 4983 directories. 
Table 3.2: Yellow Pages Directory Data Summary 
1996 2007 final 
# observations/directories 4983 7176 4983 
Internet Use Data 
CPS Internet Use Supplement 2007 records many geographic and Internet use variables at the 
individual level. The variables of interest to me are the CBSA code where each individual lives 
and the dummy variable denoting whether the person connects to the Internet from home. Using 
these two variables, I am able to calculate the percentage of people who use the Internet in 264 
CBSAs. 
A CBSA is an area of at least 10,000 people. It's a five-digit numeric code assigned to the 
metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas defined by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) . As of 2006, there are 952 unique CBSAs in the US. 
Internet Use at the Directory Level 
For the 4983 directories in the final Yellow Pages data set, I would like to calculate population 
weighted average of Internet usage. To be able to do this, I need to find the internet usage in 
each of the 30210 unique zipcodes that the 4983 directories cover. Since I have t he Internet usage 
data at the CBSA level, first I need to match the zipcodes to the CBSA codes. I do this using 
the Census data file matching 2007 zipcodes to 2006 CBSA codes. However, there are several 
problems. 
First of all, CBSA codes are not collectively exhaustive whereas zipcodes are. Consecutively, 
there are many rural zipcodes that do not fall into any defined CBSA, hence do not have a 
CBSA code assigned to them. Specifically, 6358 of the zipcodes appear in the Census match 
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file without a CBSA code. Moreover, 84 zipcodes do not even appear in the Census match file. 
These are usually universities or buildings that have their own unique zipcode. 
For the remaining 23,678 zipcodes, I have the corresponding CBSA codes from the match file . 
However , as mentioned in the previous section the CPS Internet Use Supplement has Internet 
usage data only for 264 CBSAs. More specifically, for 9917 zipcodes I have the CBSA code, but 
not Internet usage. The details are summarized in Table 3.3. Ultimately, I am able to make the 
zipcode-CBSA-internet usage match for 13,851 zipcodes. 
# zipcodes 
84 
6358 
9917 
13851 
Total= 30210 
Table 3.3: Zipcode-CBSA-Internet Use Match 
CBSA match 
X 
X 
v 
v 
internet use data notes 
zip not appear in match file(buildings) 
rural zips do not have CBSA 
x no internet usage data 
v zipcode-cbsa-internet match made 
Now that I have the Internet use data at the zipcode level, all that's left to do is to calculate 
it at the directory level by taking a population-weighted average across all zipcodes served by 
the directory. Since the directories serve 30,210 zipcodes in total and I only have Internet use 
data for 13,851 of these zipcodes, for each directory there are several zipcodes served for which 
I don 't have Internet use data. I deal with this complication in the following way. I calculate 
the percentage of a directory's population for which I have Internet data. If percentage of a 
directory 's population for which I have Internet data is less than 50 for a directory, I drop that 
directory from the analysis. Because, if I keep such a directory in the analysis, the Internet use 
information for that directory's coverage area will not be a precise measure. After this step, I'm 
left with a total of 2355 directories for which I have average Internet use data. 
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Manual Matching 
It is important to note that the 2355 directories for which I have Internet use data are directories 
that are present in 2007. Not all of these directory codes existed in year 1996. To be more specific, 
308 of these directory codes does not exist in 1996. This does not necessarily mean the directory 
itself didn't exist in 1996. Some of these 308 directories are merely assigned a different directory 
code in 2007. To find these, I compared the directory names and was able manually match 123 
out of 308. More explicitly, these 123 directories are present in 1996 and 2007 but with different 
directory codes. The summary of the final matching can be seen below in Table 3.4. Ultimately, 
my final data set is composed of 2170 directories , the 123 manual matches plus the 2047 directory 
codes that exist in both years. 
Table 3.4: Final Matching 
Directory code present in 2007 and 1996 
Directory code present in 2007 not in 1996 
# directories matched 
2047 
-manually matched 123 123 
Total 2170 
3.3.2 Final Data Set 
# directories 
2047 
308 
2355 
For the final data set of 2170 directories, the descriptive statistics of the key variables are 
summarized in Table 3.5. The price of a quarter column (qc) advertisement increased 41.1% on 
average between the years 1996 and 2007. Advertisements of different sizes experienced similar 
increases in their prices. When we look at the three competition variables we see that, overall, 
there has been a clear increase in the level of competition directories face. In 2007, each directory 
had about 3.25 more competing directories in its coverage area compared to 1996 (avgdir). The 
number of directories owned by a competing publisher, avgdirc, increased by 2.57 directories 
on average. Even more striking, the average number of competing publishers increased by 1. 78 
publishers. 
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The decrease in the high school graduate rates should be interpreted carefully. Since the 
variable denotes the percentage of people with highest degree completed being high school, a 
decrease in the high school graduate rate only means more people are going on to college and 
attaining college degrees. 
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max #Obs 
percent change in ad prices (qc) 0.4110 0.6370 -1 4 .9217 2014 
percent change in ad prices (dqc) 0.2114 0.7020 -1 3.9362 1764 
percent change in ad prices (dhc) 0.2890 0.6126 -1 4.4280 1731 
percent change in ad prices (hp) 0.2727 0.6153 -1 5.9019 1637 
percent change in ad prices (fp) 0.4039 0.7638 -1 22.5108 2068 
change in avgdir (#) 3.2534 2.0469 -5.8696 14.8331 2170 
change in avgdirc (#) 2.5710 1.7962 -2.4004 13.0185 2170 
change in avgpub (#) 1.7875 1.2274 -1 7.3184 2170 
change in population 
(in each directory's coverage area) 194228.9 285019.2 423 3803667.0000 2047 
change in urban population (% points) 
(in each directory's coverage area) 2.1393 18.8126 -94.0648 69.6484 2170 
change in college graduate rates (% points) 
(in each directory's coverage area) 
-9.7811 5.6029 -35.2078 12.1204 2170 
change in high school graduate rates (% points) 
(in each directory's coverage area) 
-56 .3036 10.7576 -86.5379 -23.8867 2170 
Utility directories 0.7673 0.4227 0 2170 
RBOC directories 0.4138 0.4926 0 2170 
Note: Please note that I don't have all five categories of prices for all the 2170 directories. 
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About 77% of all the directories have utility publishers (i.e. independent telephone company 
or RBOC). We want to be able to distinguish utility directories from non-utility ones since the 
effects of prices and competition might be different depending on the type of the publisher. 
In practice, however, utility status is not a very reliable measure. The independent telephone 
companies (telcos) are very small companies that in many ways, behave more like an independent 
publisher. Also, some RBOC's are utility publishers in some markets and independent in others. 
For these reasons, a dummy variable denoting whether a directory's publisher is an RBOC is a 
better indicator for differentiating directories. The data shows that about 41% of the directories 
can be classified as RBOCs. (Detailed description of all the variables can be found in TableA.1 
in the Appendix.) 
3.4 Estimation 
In order to do the empirical analysis, we perform a few additional transformations to the variables 
summarized in Table 3.5. First, instead of the change in prices we take the natural log of prices in 
both periods, and then use the difference of the log prices. Similarly, we also take the natural log 
of the three measures of competition in each period and use the difference of the logs. Using the 
natural log transformations makes the interpretation of the estimated coefficients more intuitive. 
We don't use the logarithmic version of the other variables since they are already in units of 
percentages. 
As mentioned before, we are interested in estimating the effect of rising Internet use between 
the years 96-07 on the Yellow Pages advertising prices and the level of competition in the market. 
The main assumption we make in our analysis is that the home Internet usage rates in 1996 were 
low enough to be overlooked. Relying on this assumption, we use the Internet usage levels in 
2007 as an independent variable instead of the change between the years 1996 and 2007. The 
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assumption is quite reasonable according to the industry polls conducted by Harris Interactive, 
a world-wide market research firm.T 
In order to quantify the effect of rising Internet use on Yellow Pages advertising prices, we 
use the following OLS specification, 
.6.ln(price )id internet07d + .6.ln(totpop)d + .6.urbpopd + .6.collgradd 
+.6.hsgradd + .6.ln( avgdir )d + .6.ln( avgdirc)d 
+.6.ln( avgpub )d + rbocd + utilityd + ln( size )i (3.4) 
where the .6. refers to the change in the relevant variables between the years 1996 and 2007, 
d refers to each directory, and i to the advertisement itself. sizei is a variable denoting the 
fraction of the page the advertisement covers. One page is divided into four columns and four 
rows, generating 16 equal sized pieces. A quarter column makes up 1/16 of a page. Accordingly, 
for a quarter column advertisement we assign size = 1. More specifically, 
size= 1 if quarter column (qc) 
size= 2 if double quarter column (dqc) 
size= 4 if double half column (dhc) 
size = 8 if half page (hp) 
size = 16 if full page ( fp) 
Since utility is not a very reliable measure of each publisher's utility status, we use both 
utility and rboc in our analysis. Used together, they improve the explanatory power of the 
regressions. As it will be evident in the results section, we will use this specification with and 
without controlling for the three competition variables, and analyze the effects in each case. 
7 Oldest industry poll conducted in 1995 indicates that only 9% of US adults reported going online either from 
home or work (Source: The Harris Poll) . 
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Our second goal is to estimate the impact of rising Internet use on the level of competition 
in the market. To do so, we use the following general specification. 
~ln(pub)z internet07z + totpopOOz + urbpopOOz + collgradOOz 
+hsgradOOz + povertyOOz + densityOOz (3.5) 
Here, the analysis is done at the zipcode level; z denoting the zipcode. (pub)z is the number 
of publishers at each zip code. Since we have demographic information at the zipcode level for 
only the 2000 census, the demographic variables used are from this specific year. Please note 
that equation (5) is the general specification used; other forms of the equation are considered 
in the results section. The summary statistics for the zipcode level market data are shown in 
Table 3.6. The data set is composed of 10,284 observations/zipcodes. The average number of 
directories per zipcode seems to have increased by 2.52 directories from 1996 to 2007. Also, there 
is an increase of 1.36 publishers per zipcode on average. 
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Zipcode Level Market Data 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of directories per zipcode 96 2.11 1.09 14 
# of directories per zipcode 07 4.63 2.01 19 
# of publishers per zipcode 96 1.85 0.77 5 
# of publishers per zipcode 07 3.21 1.18 9 
change in # of directories per zipcode 2.52 2.04 -9 16 
change in # of publishers per zipcode 1.36 1.27 -3 7 
# of observations 10,284 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Effect on Prices 
First we run a standard OLS regression of the change in log prices, controlling for the changes 
in demographics, utility status and the different sizes of the advertisements (equation 4). The 
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effect of Internet use on advertising prices can potentially be different for big utility directories 
and independent ones. Intuitively, directories published by big telephone companies that used to 
be affiliated with AT&T might be affected less by the rising use of the Internet since these utility 
publishers tend to dominate their markets. Accordingly, all the regressions include publisher FE 
for the 67 publishers that were present in 2007. 
Surprisingly, we see that Internet use has a positive and significant effect on the change in 
prices (Table 3.7) . More specifically, one percentage increase in the use of Internet among the 
public in the directory's coverage area leads to a 10.6% increase in advertising prices in that 
particular directory (Table 3.7, regression (1)). When we use the same specification and control 
for the changes in the three competition measures (regression (3)), the effect becomes even more 
pronounced. Controlling for the changes in the level of competition, a one percentage increase 
in Internet usage leads to a 13.0% increase in prices, and the coefficient is significant. 
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Table 3 .7 : Internet's Effect on Advertising Prices 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Llln(price) Llln(price) Llln(price) 
internet use(%) 0.106*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 
(0.0338) (0 .0383) (0.0383) 
Llln( tot pop) 0.0537*** 0.0606*** 0.0613*** 
(0 .00473) (0.00513) (0.00515) 
Ll(urbpop) -0.000488*** -0.000426** -0.000407** 
(0 .000150) (0 .000166) (0 .000167) 
Ll ( collgrad) 0.00491 *** 0.00463*** 0.00455*** 
(0.000566) (0.000617) (0.000620) 
Ll(hsgrad) -0.00297*** -0.00292*** -0.00295*** 
(0.000309) (0.000350) (0.000352) 
Llln(avgpub) -0.00200 0.0140 
(0.00285) (0.0110) 
rboc 0.0628*** 0.0612*** 0.0601 *** 
(0 .00780) (0 .00869) (0 .00876) 
utility -0.147*** -0.143*** -0.145*** 
(0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
ln(size) -0.0409*** -0.0404*** -0.0404*** 
(0.00231) (0.00252) (0.00252) 
Llln (a vgdirc) -0.0142 
(0.0121) 
Llln( avgdir) -0.00250 
(0.00658) 
Constant 0.0214 -0.00695 -0.0108 
(0.0947) (0.0976) (0.0976) 
Observations 7645 6715 6715 
R-squared 0.232 0.235 0.235 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p< O.Ol , ** p< 0.05, * p<O.l 
Note: all regressions include publisher FE for the 67 publishers present in 2007 
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Table 3.8: Internet 's Effect on Advertising Prices (clustered errors at CBSA level) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES fl.ln(price) fl.ln (price) fl.ln(price) 
internet use(%) 0.204** 0.236** 0.237** 
(0.0968) (0.111) (0.109) 
fl.ln ( tot pop) 0.0478*** 0.0530*** 0.0540*** 
(0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0187) 
fl. ( urbpop) -0 .000545* -0.000522 -0.000501 
(0.000327) (0.000372) (0.000363) 
fl. (col! grad) 0.00428*** 0.00407*** 0.00399*** 
(0.00138) (0 .00152) (0.00146) 
fl. (hsgrad) -0.00195*** -0.00191** -0.00193** 
(0.000719) (0.000782) (0.000802) 
fl.ln(avgpub) -0.00184 0.0206 
(0.00455) (0.0469) 
rboc 0.0786*** 0.0723*** 0.0706*** 
(0 .0166) (0.0174) (0.0185) 
utility -0.185*** -0.178*** -0.180*** 
(0.0345) (0.0334) (0.0338) 
ln(size) -0.0445*** -0.0440*** -0.0440*** 
(0.00306) (0.00326) (0.00325) 
fl.ln( avgdirc) -0.0213 
(0.0454) 
fl.ln (avgdir) -0.00193 
(0.0102) 
Constant 0.0520 0.0259 0.0208 
(0.0490) (0.0538) (0 .0540) 
Observations 5792 5173 5173 
R-squared 0.255 0.260 0.260 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01 , ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: all regressions include publisher FE for the 67 publishers present in 2007 
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Since the effect on prices is surprisingly positive, we suspect that we might be making the 
mistake of assuming all the observations are independent in a particular group, where they 
are actually correlated. More specifically, the Internet data we use for each directory might 
be possibly correlated for the directories that fall under the same CBSA. Since the original 
Internet use data is at the CBSA level, and is transformed to the zipcode level for the purpose of 
our estimation, there is a good chance that the observations in the same CBSA are correlated. 
To allow for this correlation, we do the same estimation as in Table 3.7, but we cluster the 
observations at the CBSA level. The procedure adjusts standard errors for intragroup correlation, 
hence should only affect the estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators, not the estimated coefficients. However, since we don't know the CBSA code of 
every directory, the estimated coefficients are also slighlty affected. As evident from Table 3.8, 
the significance of the coefficients on Internet use decrease from 1% to 5% after the clustering, 
but they seem to remain positive and significant even after the clustering. 
3.5.2 Effect on Competition 
The standard OLS analysis of regressing the change in the number of publishers at every zip code 
on Internet use controlling for 2000 demographics reveal estimates that are quite significant 
(Table 3.9, columns (1) and (2)). One percentage increase in Internet use at a given zipcode 
leads to a 29.7% decrease in the number of publishers at that zipcode, which corresponds to 
about a decrease of one publisher per zipcode (-0.748). When we use the change in the number 
of directories per zipcode as the dependent variable in regressions (3) and ( 4), the estimates are 
not as significant. One percentage increase in Internet use at a given zipcode leads to a 18.3% 
decrease in the number of directories at that zipcode, which corresponds to about a decrease of 
0.25 directories per zipcode. This result implies that as the Internet usage increases, the Yellow 
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P ages directory market experiences consolidation; the number of directories does not necessarily 
decrease whereas the number of publishers experiences a significant reduction. 
Table 3.9 : Internet's Effect on Competition at the Zipcode Level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES D.ln(# publisher) b. (# publisher) D.ln(# directories) b.(# directories) 
internet use (%) -0.297*** -0.748*** -0.183** -0.252 
(0 .0665) (0 .162) (0.0732) (0.243) 
ln(totpop) 0.0875*** 0.232*** 0.110*** 0.390*** 
(0 .00438) (0.0107) (0 .00482) (0 .0160) 
urbpop -0.0578*** -0 .152*** -0.0211 -0.134* 
(0 .0222) (0.0543) (0.0245) (0.0812) 
collgrad -0 .0123 -0.500* 0.396*** 2.126*** 
(0.122) (0 .297) (0 .134) (0.444) 
hsgrad -0.519*** -2.149*** -0.406*** -3 .111 *** 
(0.0921) (0.225) (0 .101) (0.336) 
poverty 0.856*** 1.133*** 0.686*** -0.169 
(0 .0700) (0.171) (0 .0771) (0 .255) 
ln( density) -0.0188*** -0.0592*** 0.0155*** 0.115*** 
(0 .00436) (0.0107) (0 .00481) (0 .0159) 
Constant 0.180*** 0.685*** -0.123* -0.802*** 
(0 .0677) (0.165) (0 .0746) (0.247) 
Observations 10284 10284 10284 10284 
R-squared 0.083 0.088 0.139 0.209 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01 , ** p < 0.05 , * p < 0.1 
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Table 3. 10: Internet's Effect on Competition (clustered errors at CBSA level) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES /j.Jn(# publisher) /j.(# publisher) /j.Jn(# directories) /j.(# directories) 
internet use(%) -0.297 -0.748 -0.183 -0.252 
(0.290) (0.811) (0.329) (1.092) 
ln(totpop) 0.0875*** 0.232*** 0.110*** 0.390*** 
(0.00860) (0.0224) (0 .00881) (0.0273) 
urbpop -0.0578 -0.152 -0.0211 -0.134 
(0.0526) (0.144) (0.0468) (0 .152) 
collgrad -0.0123 -0.500 0.396 2.126** 
(0.234) (0.569) (0.251) (0 .937) 
hsgrad -0.519*** -2.149*** -0.406* -3.111 *** 
(0 .192) (0.554) (0.242) (0 .846) 
poverty 0.856*** 1.133** 0.686*** 
-0.169 
(0.198) (0.514) (0 .134) (0.534) 
In( density) -0.0188* -0.0592** 0.0155 0.115** 
(0.0106) (0.0274) (0.0121) (0.0509) 
Constant 0.180 0.685 -0.123 -0.802 
(0.230) (0.648) (0.229) (0.797) 
Observations 10284 10284 10284 10284 
R-squared 0.083 0.088 0.139 0.209 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01 , ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1 
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Even though the results of Table 3.9 might seem convincing at first, we might be making 
the mistake of assuming all the observations are independent in a particular group, where they 
are actually correlated. More specifically, the observations that we have for each zipcode might 
be possibly correlated for the zipcodes that fall in the same CBSA. Since the original Internet 
use data is at the CBSA level, and is transformed to the zipcode level for the purpose of our 
estimation, there is a good chance that the observations in the same CBSA are correlated. 
To allow for this correlation, we cluster the observations at the CBSA level. The procedure 
adjusts standard errors for intragroup correlation; hence affects the estimated standard errors 
and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the estimated coefficients. The results 
can be seen in Table 3.10. 
Once we allow for intragroup correlation, the coefficients on intemetuse cease to be significant 
for all four regressions. The change in the magnitude of standard errors from Table 3.9 to Table 
3.10 is remarkable. As expected, the correlation of observations in each CBSA is quite important, 
and it is driving force behind the significant coefficients in Table 3.9. To some extent, this result 
is due to the nature of the Internet use data available. The CPS supplement provides Internet 
use data only at the CBSA level; the results would have been more robust and interesting if the 
Internet use data were at the zipcode level. 
Another question of interest is how the expanding use of Internet affects the rboc and nonrboc 
directories differently. To analyze this question, we regress the change in the number of rboc and 
nonrboc directories on intemetuse with relevant controls in Table 3.11. The number of directories 
by rboc publishers seems to have decreased with expanding use of Internet, whereas the ones 
by nonrboc publishers seems to have increased. Moreover, the estimates remain significant after 
the clustering. An intuitive explanation of the result might be that since rboc publishers are 
associated closely with online yellowpages sites, they give less emphasis their printed directories 
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with the expanding use of the Internet , hence decrease the number of directories they publish. 
Table 3 .11: Internet 's Effect on rboc and utility Publishers (clustered errors at CBSA level) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables .6.In(rboc) .6.In(nonrboc) .6.In(utility) .6.(rboc) .6. ( nonrboc) .6. (utility) 
internetuse(% )-0.167 0.418* -0.379** 0.662* -0.698** 
0.685*** 
(0.116) (0.217) (0.159) (0 .248) (0.342) (0 .329) 
In(totpop) 0.0137** 0.0482*** 0.0529*** 0.0512*** 0.0617*** 0.133*** 
(0.00570) (0.00668) (0.00506) (0.00688) (0.00897) (0.00910) 
urbpop -0.0684* 0.0157 -0.0785* -0.120* 0.0462 -0.130* 
(0.0363) (0.0400) (0.0407) (0 .0697) (0.0648) (0.0789) 
collgrad 0.221* 0.0787 0.517*** 0.0389 0.648* 0.597 
(0.132) (0.259) (0.190) (0.290) (0.389) (0.371) 
hsgrad -0.0580 0.260* 0.0225 -0.0581 0.560* 0.199 
(0.116) (0.153) (0.122) (0.263) (0.307) (0.281) 
poverty -0.200** 0.170 0.0767 0.0254 0.631 *** 0.419* 
(0.0768) (0.137) (0.101) (0.197) (0 .186) (0.235) 
In( density) 0.00478 
0.0514*** 0.0263*** 0.0397** 0.0880*** 0.0921 *** 
(0.00875) (0.00762) (0 .00930) (0.0161) (0.0120) (0 .0184) 
Constant 0.103 -0.455** 0.0665 0.342 -0.660** -0.121 
(0.104) (0 .179) (0.137) (0.226) (0.271) (0 .283) 
Observations 5628 6155 8157 9461 9461 9461 
R- O.Dl8 0.039 0.032 0.041 0.032 0.066 
squared 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01 , ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This article examines the impact of rising Internet use on prices and the level of competition 
for advertisements in Yellow Pages directories. First, we find that rising Internet use leads 
to a significant increase in printed YP advertisement prices. One percentage increase in the 
use of Internet among the population in the directory's coverage area leads to a 10.6% increase 
in advertising prices in that particular directory. Second, we find that Internet use leads to a 
significant reduction in the level of competition at the zipcode level. However, the coefficients 
lose their significance once we allow for intragroup correlation within each CBSA. Moreover, big 
telephone companies (RBOCs) and independent directories seem to be affected differently. Esti-
mates show that the number of directories published by RBOCs have decreased with expanding 
use of Internet, whereas the ones by smaller independent publishers seems to have increased. 
Overall, the results provide empirical support for the economic models which claim that 
the availability of an online sector in a certain market has the potential to decrease the level 
of competition in its traditional counterpart. More importantly, the positive effect of Internet 
use on prices implies that the reduction in the supply of printed YP advertisements due to the 
expansion of the Internet is greater relative to the decrease in demand for these advertisements. 
Future work could include empirically examining the effects on competition with better Internet 
use data that is available for all the CBSAs or at the zipcode level. 
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3. 7 Appendix 3.A 
Table A.l: Explanation of variables 
Name Description 
ave internet %of people who has access to the internet from home at directory's coverage 
internet use 
qc 
dqc 
dhc 
hp 
fp 
tot pop 
urbpop 
hsgrad 
collgrad 
maputil 
rboc 
avgdir 
avgdirc 
avgpub 
poverty 
density 
area 
% of people who has access to the internet from home in each zipcode 
price of a quarter column advertisement 
price of a double quarter column advertisement 
price of a double half column advertisement 
price of a half page advertisement 
price of a full page advert isement 
total population of a directory's coverage area 
% of people living in an urban area 
% of people who graduated from high school 
% of people who graduated from college 
dummy for being from a utility publisher, from mapping data 
dummy for being from a publisher that used to be associated with AT&T 
# of competing directories in a directory's coverage area 
# of competing directories owned by a competing publisher in a directory's 
coverage area 
# of competing publishers in a directory's coverage area 
% of people under the poverty line 
total population divided by square milage 
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